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Note
PREJUDICE AND RETROACTIVITY: LIMITS ON
HABEAS RELIEF IN LOCKHART V. FRETWELL
INTRODUCTION
In Lockhart v. Fretwel4' the Supreme Court considered whether, in
a capital sentencing proceeding, an attorney's failure to make an ob-
jection that would have been supported by a decision which later was
overruled constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment.2 The Court held that because the objection would not
be sustained under current law, the criminal defendant suffered no
prejudice.3 Consequently, counsel's assistance was not ineffective.4
Moreover, the Court maintained that the retroactive application of
new rules in federal habeas corpus appeals is permissible when the
application of the new rule does not undermine a state's finality and
reliance interests.' In so holding, the Court modified the prejudice
prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel announced in
Strickland v. Washington6 and effectively created a third exception to
the retroactivity rule set forth in Teague v. Lane.7
This Note will review the legal background of the Fretwell decision
with attention to the development of the prejudice standard for inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims and the evolution of the retroactiv-
ity rule in the context of habeas corpus. The Note will argue that
while the Court's modification of the Strickland prejudice prong will
make ineffective assistance of counsel claims more difficult to prove,
its alteration of the Teague standard may have an even broader impact.
The Fretwell holding implies that defendants who suffer errors based
on the law in force at the time of trial must make their case for federal
1. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to assistance
of counsel in criminal prosecutions. It has been consistently construed to include the right
to effective assistance of counsel. Katherine M. McCormack-Traugott, Project, Twenty-First
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1990-
1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 939, 1354 (1992) [hereinafter Project]. The right to effective assistance
of counsel extends to the sentencing phase of a capital proceeding. See id. at 1361 n.1684.
3. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
7. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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habeas relief under subsequent precedent whenever subsequent pre-
cedent benefits the state's defense against collateral attack.
I. THE CASE
In 1985, an Arkansas jury convicted Bobby Ray Fretwell of capital
murder for committing a fatal shooting in the course of a robbery.'
At Fretwell's sentencing hearing, the State argued that the jury should
consider two aggravating factors in deciding whether to impose the
death penalty: (1) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain
and (2) that the murder was committed to facilitate Fretwell's escape.9
The jury found evidence of the first aggravating factor and sentenced
Fretwell to death.1 °
On direct appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court,'1 Fretwell ar-
gued that his sentence should be vacated based on the holding in
Collins v. Lockhart.12 In Collins, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found unconstitutional the Arkansas courts' practice of al-
lowing juries to consider killing for pecuniary gain as both an element
of felony murder and an aggravating circumstance to be considered in
deliberating on the death penalty.'" The Arkansas court refused to
consider the Collins question because Fretwell's counsel had failed to
object to the use of the pecuniary gain aggravating factor during the
sentencing hearing. 4 Consequently, the Court upheld Fretwell's
death sentence.'
5
After exhausting his state habeas remedies,' 6 Fretwell brought a
petition in federal district court claiming ineffective assistance of
8. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 739 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (E.D. Ark. 1990), affd, 946 F.2d 571
(8th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
9. Id
10. Id
11. Fretwell v. State, 708 S.W.2d 630 (Ark. 1986).
12. 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
13. Id. at 263. The court found this "double-counting" unconstitutional because it
failed to legitimately distinguish between felony-murderers who should be subject to the
death penalty and those who should be awarded a more lenient sentence. Id. at 264.
Moreover, "double-counting" can lead the jury to mistakenly believe that it has already
resolved the death penalty question during the guilt phase of the trial. Id.
14. Fretwe, 708 S.W.2d at 634.
15. Id.
16. Fretwell filed a state habeas corpus petition citing his counsel's failure to make a
Collins objection as evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Fretwell v. State, 728
S.W.2d 180 (Ark. 1987). Because at the time of Fretwell's trial the Arkansas courts had yet
to rule on whether the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the Arkansas statute was in har-
mony with state court interpretation, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Fretwell's
habeas claim. Id. at 181.
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counsel. 7 Applying the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland,8 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held that counsel's
failure to object at sentencing to the submission of pecuniary gain as a
potential aggravating circumstance constituted deficient performance
and was prejudicial,' 9 even though the Eighth Circuit had subse-
quently overruled Collins in Peny v. Lockhart.20 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and remanded to the Dis-
trict Court with instructions to reduce Fretwell's sentence to life in
prison without parole.2'
II. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fretwell to consider
whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim satisfied the Strick-
land prejudice standard22 when counsel's performance was prejudicial
as gauged by precedent valid at the time of the legal proceeding, but
overruled by the time of the appeal.2" The Court held that if new
legal rules invalidated the "substantive or procedural" right that
formed the basis of a petitioner's habeas claim, counsel's perform-
ance would not be deemed prejudicial because it would not deny the
petitioner a right protected by law.24 Noting that, unlike the state, a
habeas petitioner has no interest in the finality of the state court judg-
ment rendered in the original proceeding, the Court also held that
new legal rules that benefit the State can be applied retroactively in
adjudicating a habeas claim.25
17. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 739 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Ark. 1990). Fretwell's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
18. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To successfully advance an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was both deficient and preju-
dicial. A defendant may show deficient performance by demonstrating that counsel's
performance was unreasonable under legal standards applicable at the time of the pro-
ceeding. I&. Prejudice is demonstrated by showing that "but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 694.
19. Fretwell, 739 F. Supp. at 1337.
20. 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Constitution does not bar the use
of killing for pecuniary gain as both an element of the offense of felony-murder and an
aggravating factor in a capital sentencing proceeding).
21. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1991), reuld, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
Noting that Fretwell was entitled to the benefit of a Collins objection at the time of trial, the
Eighth Circuit held that sentencing him under current law would "perpetuate the preju-
dice caused by the original sixth amendment violation." Id. at 578.
22. See supra note 18.
23. Fretwel4 113 S. Ct. 838, 841 (1993). The State conceded that counsel's performance
was deficient; the only question before the Court was whether that performance resulted in
prejudice. Id, at 842 n.1.
24. Id. at 844.
25. Id.
246 [VOL. 53:244
LIMITS ON HABEAS RELIEF
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a
Strickland prejudice analysis should not focus solely on whether the
outcome of a trial would have been different but for counsel's er-
rors.26 Rather, a Strickland inquiry implicates the fundamental fairness
and reliability of the legal proceeding in question." For a trial to be
unfair, it must deny the defendant a "substantive or procedural"
right.2" According to the Court, Fretwell was not denied any rights
because the decision that granted them- Collins-had since been
overruled.29 Though the Court conceded that the outcome of
Fretwell's sentencing proceeding would likely have been different had
his attorney made an objection based on Collins, it argued that to find
prejudice now would grant Fretwell a "windfall" to which he was not
entitled."0
The Court also held that while the deficient performance prong
of the test required an assessment of counsel's performance from a
perspective contemporaneous with the time of trial, the prejudice
prong could be evaluated from a hindsight perspective. 1 According
to the Court, the use of a hindsight perspective in the prejudice evalu-
ation did not have the potential to interfere with counsel's "ardor"
and "independence" like its use in the deficient performance assess-
ment. Because the prejudice evaluation focuses only on the impact of
counsel's deficient performance and not on counsel's professional
judgment at the time of trial, it does not result in judicial "second-
guessing" of an attorney's work. 2 The Court maintained that this use
of a hindsight framework was not inconsistent with the Teague rule"3
limiting the retroactive application of "new rules" on collateral re-
view. 4 Thus, the Perry decision overturning Collins could be applied
retroactively to Fretwell's habeas petition. Because Fretwell's attorney
had not made a Collins objection and, consequently, the State had not
26. See id at 842.
27. I&
28. Id. at 844.
29. See id ("[It was the premise of our grant in this case that Pery was correctly de-
cided, i.e., that respondent was not entitled to an objection based on 'double counting.'
Respondent therefore suffered no prejudice from his counsel's deficient performance.").
30. Id, at 843.
31. Id, at 844.
32. Id.
33. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court held that new rules will not be
applied retroactively to petitioners on habeas review unless the rule "places 'certain kinds
of... conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe'" or
involves a major revision of the court's understanding of a petitioner's procedural constitu-
tional rights. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 677, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)).
34. Id, at 316.
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relied on Collins, the State had no need to protect its finality and reli-
ance interests as provided for by the Teague rule. 5 The Court main-
tained that this holding was a "perfectly logical limitation of Teague to
the circumstances which gave rise to it." 6
Justice O'Connor concurred, stating that the Fretwell holding was
merely a product of the unusual circumstances presented when a
habeas petitioner advances a prejudice claim by urging a "decidedly
incorrect point of law."37 For most ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, she reasoned, the Strickland rule assessing the effect of coun-
sel's error on the outcome of the proceeding would remain the opera-
tive standard." Justice Thomas also concurred, writing separately to
argue that the Eighth Circuit misunderstood the Supremacy Clause
when it suggested that the Arkansas courts were bound to follow the
Collins decision.3 9
Justice Stevens dissented, filing an opinion in which Justice Black-
mun joined.4 ° The dissenters argued that the result in Fretwell meant
that through "coincidence... and fortuitous timing" states may carry
out death sentences that were "invalid when imposed."41 The dissent-
ers contended that the majority accomplished this result through the
retroactive application of two changes in the law that occurred after
Fretwell's trial: (1) the rule in Perry holding double-counting constitu-
tional and (2) the introduction of a hindsight perspective in the prej-
udice prong of the Strickland standard.4 2 The dissenters argued that
the Court ignored Stricklands emphasis on the outcome of the pro-
ceeding by requiring that a defendant show an "additional indicia of
unreliability" when advancing prejudice claims.43 They further as-
serted that in adopting a hindsight framework, the Court inequitably
applied the retroactivity rule of Teague creating, in effect, a "windfall"
for State courts.44
35. Fretwel, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 848.
44. Id. at 853.
248 [VOL. 53:244
LIMITS ON HABEAS RELIEF
III. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Prejudice Requirement
A defendant may collaterally attack a final judgment by claiming
that her Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair trial was violated by
ineffective assistance of counsel.45 Prior to 1984, state and lower fed-
eral courts nearly uniformly applied a general reasonableness stan-
dard for evaluating the performance of counsel,46 but applied
different tests to evaluate the prejudice caused by counsel's perform-
ance.4 7 Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Strickland v.
Washington to develop coherent standards by which to judge ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims.48 In Strickland, the Court developed
a two-pronged test: criminal defendants claiming ineffective assist-
ance of counsel at trial must show deficient performance 49 and preju-
dice.5" To show prejudice under Strickland, the defendant had to
show "a reasonable probability51 that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."52
45. Project, supra note 2, at 1363. The ingredients necessary for a "fair trial" are de-
fined in the Sixth Amendment. They include speed, publicness, impartiality, issues and
law ascertained prior to the proceeding, provision for witnesses for and against the ac-
cused, and the assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 686, 683-84, 696-97 (1984).
47. Id. at 684.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 687. A defendant may show deficient performance by demonstrating that
counsel's performance was unreasonable under current professional standards. Id. at 687-
88. While the Strickland Court maintained that more exacting standards were inappropri-
ate, it did recognize a wide range of basic duties for which defense counsel may be ac-
countable. These include the duties to avoid conflicts of interest, advocate for the
defendant's cause, consult with the defendant on important decisions, update the defend-
ant on developments in the course of litigation, and "bring to bear such skill and knowl-
edge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688. Defense
counsel is entitled to a strong presumption of effectiveness to avoid "second-guessing" by
the reviewing court. Id. at 689. See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666 (1984)
(holding that no basis exists for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim absent a showing
of "specific errors made by trial counsel").
50. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Prejudice is presumed in three circumstances: actual or
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel, state interference with counsel's assistance,
and assistance rendered when counsel is subject to a conflict of interest. Id. at 692.
51. Id. at 693. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome." Id. at 694. In arriving at this "reasonable probability" standard,
the Court expressly rejected the idea that a defendant need only show counsel's error had
"some conceivable effect" on the outcome because nearly any error could satisfy that bur-
den. Id. It also rejected the view that a defendant must show that counsel's conduct "more
likely than not" affected the proceeding's outcome because that requirement would place
too great a burden on the defendant. Id. at 693-94.
52. Id. (comparing the requirement to tests for the materiality of previously undis-
closed exculpatory information and previously unavailable testimony).
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B. Retroactivity in Habeas Corpus
A defendant in state custody is entitled to federal habeas corpus
relief when she is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States."5 3 An application for the writ will not
be granted unless the petitioner has exhausted remedies available in
state court. 4 The scope and purpose of the writ have changed consid-
erably over the course of this century.5 Members of the Court have
variously characterized56 the writ as a deterrent,57 a federal court rem-
edy,58 an appellate review of constitutional claims,59 a mechanism for
correcting errors affecting "fundamental fairness,"6" and a means of
protecting petitioners with a colorable claim of innocence.6"
Federal habeas corpus relief stands in tension with state court in-
terests in finality, reliance, and comity.62 The competing concerns of
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
54. Id. But see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982) (holding that a state prisoner
barred by procedural default from raising a constitutional claim may advance it with a
showing of cause and actual prejudice).
55. The history of the Great Writ is the subject of controversy among current members
of the Court. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2489 nn.6-7 (1992) (including a spirited
debate between Justices Thomas and O'Connor on the history of federal habeas courts'
standard of review of state court applications of law to fact). The Court recognized, how-
ever, a history of defining the scope of habeas by weighing both the costs and benefits of
the writ. See id. at 2491.
56. The schema that follows is adapted from WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 28.2 (1992).
57. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989). The Court noted that habeas serves as a
necessary additional incentive for [state] trial and appellate courts throughout the land to
conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional stan-
dards.'" Id. (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
58. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 431 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan
argued that Congress intended habeas review "to provide petitioners a remedy for unlawful
state deprivations of their liberty interests through a fresh and full review of their claims by
an Article III court." Id. at 427. A majority of the Court declared this view "manifest fed-
eral policy" in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
59. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The Court held that even when state courts
have rejected a petitioner's claims after a full and fair hearing, federal courts on habeas
review must determine whether or not the state court "reached a satisfactory conclusion."
Id at 463.
60. Teague, 489 U.S. at 319 (1989) (StevensJ, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Justice Stevens contended that Teague's retroactivity rule should include
an exception for "new rules" that go to the "fundamental fairness" of state court proceed-
ings. 1d.
61. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 232-33 (1969) (BlackJ, dissenting).
62. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2491 (1992) ("'[Habeas review] disturbs the
State's significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to
punish some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty.'") (citations omitted).
See also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (noting that habeas review frustrates a
state's power to punish criminals and honor constitutional rights). A state's interest in
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the defendant's interest in fairness 63 and the state's interest in finality
have led courts to promulgate standards to determine whether new
rules of law64 should be applied retroactively in habeas proceedings. 65
Originally, courts applied a single balancing test in cases on both di-
rect and collateral review to determine whether new rules would apply
retroactively.66 The test weighed (a) the purpose of the new rule, (b)
the extent to which law enforcement relied on old standards, and (c)
the effect retroactive application of the new rule would have on the
"administration of justice."67
The Court, in Teague v. Lane,' sought to rectify inconsistencies
that resulted from applying this three-part standard to cases on collat-
eral review.69 Teague held that generally new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure would not be applied to cases that become final
on direct appeal before the new rules are announced.7 ° The Teague
Court grounded its retroactivity rule on the purposes of habeas
corpus.71 One function of habeas is to provide an incentive for state
finality is not simply that a particular case remain undisturbed. Rather, the state's interest
also contemplates its role as a competent, good faith interpreter of constitutional rights.
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 ("'[I]f a criminal judgment is ever to be final, the notion of
legality must at some point include the assignment of final competence to determine legality.'")
(emphasis added & omitted) (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 450-51 (1963)).
63. The habeas petitioner has an interest in fairness because she is seeking a remedy
for unlawful deprivation of her liberty interests. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
64. The standard for determining what constitutes a "new rule" has undergone some
revision since it was announced in Teague. The precise standard adopted by the Court is
unclear. Teague indicated that a case announces a new rule when it "breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States or Federal Government." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
The Court's decision in Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990), appears to have relaxed
and broadened the new rule standard. According to the Butler Court, a decision may an-
nounce a new rule if the issue was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" as
evidenced by a significant difference of opinion among the lower courts. Id. at 415.
Though a plurality of the Court endorsed the Butler standard in Wright Justices O'Connor,
Blackmun, and Stevens maintained that the standard for a "new rule" is objective and not
necessarily evidenced by the "mere existence of conflicting authority." Fretwell, 112 S. Ct. at
2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1967) (affirming a three-part retroactiv-
ity test); Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13 (adopting, with modifications, Justice Harlan's retroac-
tivity rule for cases on collateral review).
66. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297.
67. Id (citing favorably Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)).
68. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
69. Id at 302. Under the balancing test, similarly situated defendants could be subject
to different treatment. Id A defendant in a case announcing a new rule was merely a
.chance beneficiary" of that rule, even though subsequent habeas petitioners might not
benefit from its retroactive application. Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 306.
19941
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
courts to conduct their proceedings "in a manner consistent with es-
tablished constitutional standards."7 2 The Teague retroactivity rule was
consistent with this deterrence function because allowing courts to ap-
ply current law on habeas would remove an incentive for states to be
good faith interpreters of the Constitution during initial proceedings.
The Teague Court adopted two exceptions to the retroactivity
rule. It held that new rules will be applied retroactively on collateral
review if (1) "[the new rule] places 'certain kinds of primary, private,
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making au-
thority to proscribe,'" or (2) if "[the new rule] requires the observance
of 'those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'"" The Court read the second exception narrowly, holding
that the new rule would be applied retroactively only if it both en-
hanced the accuracy of the trial court's determination and if it repre-
sented a major revision in our understanding of fundamental
procedural rights necessary to a fair trial."4
The Teague Court did not directly address the applicability of its
retroactivity rule in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding,75
but it rejected the contention that its approach to retroactivity was
"wholly inapplicable to the capital sentencing context."76 Further-
more, it suggested in dicta that capital sentencing proceedings involve
state finality interests comparable to those that exist in the guilt phase
of trials. 77 In Peniy v. Lynaugh,7s a sharply divided Court agreed.
Holding that state interests in finality outweigh defendants' interests
in error-free proceedings even in the capital sentencing context,79 the
Penry Court found Teague's retroactivity rule applicable in the capital
sentencing context.8°
72. Id, (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
73. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 677, 692-93
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted)).
74. Id. at 311-12.
75. 1I at 313 n.2.
76. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
79. Id. at 314.
80. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Increased Requirements for a Prejudice Showing
Fretwell expanded the prejudice showing required of a habeas pe-
titioner seeking to advance an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under the Sixth Amendment. Declaring a prejudice showing based
on "mere outcome determination" insufficient, the Fretwell Court
maintained that, in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a petitioner must show "unfairness" resulting from the
"depriv[ation] ... of [a] substantive or procedural right to which the
law entitles him.""1 Neither of the cases on which the Court relied-
Strickland v. Washington8 and Nix v. Witeside 3-provides support for
this holding.
The prejudice test articulated in Strickland evaluated the impact
of counsel's errors on the outcome of a trial. 4 Recognizing that er-
rors by counsel always could have some conceivable impact on a trial's
outcome, the Strickland Court required a showing of a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." 5 The Strickland Court
cautioned against mechanical application of the rule, noting that any
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims must focus on the
"fundamental fairness" of the proceeding at issue.8 6 Fairness in Strick-
land was measured by whether counsel's error caused a "breakdown of
the adversarial process" central to reliable adjudication.87 Invoking
81. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
82. 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
83. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
84. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. Id, at 696.
87. Id, In fact, the Strickland Court intended the prejudice test and its call for attention
to "fundamental fairness" to create a lesser burden for defendants than the strict "outcome-
determinative" test then in operation in several lower courts. See id. at 697. "With regard
to the prejudice inquiry, only the strict outcome-determinative test, among the standards
articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier burden on defendants than the tests laid
down today." I.
The "outcome-determinative test" required a showing by defendants that, but for
counsel's error, the outcome of the trial "more likely than not" would have been different.
See id. at 693. The "more likely than not" standard comports with the test used to judge
motions for new trials based on the discovery of new evidence. The Strickland Court found
the standard inappropriate in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel assessments.
Id. at 694. The Court asserted that it presupposed "that all the essential elements of a
presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is
challenged." Id. Since ineffective assistance of counsel claims seek to challenge that very
presupposition, the Court reasoned that the "reasonable probability" standard was more
appropriate. Id.
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Stricklands emphasis on "fairness," the Fretwell Court at once trans-
formed it. It held that unfairness no longer results simply when the
adversarial process malfunctions, but rather only when that malfunc-
tion has some effect on the defendant's substantive or procedural
rights."8 The Court required defendants to show an "additional indicia
of unreliability, some specific way in which the breakdown of the ad-
versarial process affected respondent's discrete trial rights." 9
In support of its new prejudice requirement, the Court referred
to its holding in Nix v. Whiteside.9 ° In Whiteside, the habeas petitioner
claimed that ineffective assistance of counsel should be presumed be-
cause his counsel was subject to a conflict of interest.9" The "conflict
of interest" Whiteside advanced, however, was a conflict between his
interest in testifying falsely at trial and his counsel's ethical obligation
to ensure that his client's testimony was not perjured.92 The Court
based its finding that Whiteside had suffered no prejudice on a rejec-
tion of this conflict of interest theory and the presumption of preju-
dice that accompanied it.9" The Court rejected the theory because
Whiteside "claimed a right the law simply [did not recognize,""4 and
noted that "every guilty criminal's conviction would be suspect if the
defendant had sought to obtain an acquittal by illegal means."9 5
The Fretwell Court found Fretwell's reliance on the now defunct
right to a Collins objection comparable to the nonexistent right to per-
jure oneself claimed in Whiteside.96 In so doing, the Fretwell Court ig-
nored a principal difference between Whiteside and Fretwell:
Fretwell had a right to an objection based on Collins at the time of his
sentencing proceeding but Whiteside never had a right to present per-
jured testimony.9 Consequently, Fretwell was not a member of the
class of habeas petitioners against which the Whiteside holding was
meant to guard. By disregarding the fundamental distinction be-
88. Fretwel4 113 S. Ct. at 844 ("Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffec-
tiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right
to which the law entitles him.").
89. Id at 848 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
91. Id. at 176. Prejudice is entitled to a limited presumption in cases of conflict of
interest. Id
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 186 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 176.
96. See Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 845 ("[T]he impact of advocating a decidedly incorrect
point of law, like the influence of perjured testimony, is not a proper consideration [under
Strickland].") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 841.
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tween Fretwell's and Whiteside's claims, the Fretwell Court increased
the burden on defendants by requiring them to demonstrate an injury
to their existing substantive or procedural rights when advancing a
prejudice claim under Strickland.
B. Hindsight Frame of Reference
To reach its holding that, under the prejudice prong of the Strick-
land test, a defendant must show that counsel's performance affected
the outcome of her trial and denied her an existing substantive or
procedural right, the Fretwell Court asserted that prejudice may be
judged according to current legal standards, rather than those in ef-
fect at the time of the defendant's trial or sentencing.98 Permitting
this "hindsight" perspective had the effect of applying the "new rule"
announced in Perry v. Lockharz 9 retroactively against Fretwell, even
though Fretwell had completed direct review by the time Perry was de-
cided. The Court attempted to support its use of a hindsight perspec-
tive with its holdings in Strickland and Teague.'
1. Hindsight and the prejudice prong.-The Fretwell Court asserted
that a hindsight analysis of prejudice is permissible because the evalu-
ation of prejudice does not give rise to the same concerns that militate
against hindsight review of counsel's performance. 10 1 For example,
permitting hindsight review of counsel's performance may deter de-
fense counsel from accepting cases or attempting original trial strate-
gies for fear of post-conviction "second guessing" by habeas review
courts. 102 The Fretwell Court argued that these concerns are not at
98. Id. at 844.
99. 871 F.2d 1384, 1393 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the fact that a killing was com-
mitted for pecuniary gain may be considered both an element of the offense of capital
felony murder and an aggravating factor in a capital sentencing proceeding). The Perry
holding overturned the Collins rule against "double counting." See supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text. Although the Perry rule constituted a "new rule" under the Court's
previously articulated standards, see supra note 62, the Court did not directly address this
issue in FretwelL Instead, it merely accepted as "the premise of [its] grant in [the] case" that
defendants such as Fretwell were no longer entitled to objections based on "double count-
ing." Fretwell 113 S. Ct. at 844.
The Court's assumption that the Perry holding constituted a new rule was evidenced,
however, in its treatment of the retroactivity issue. Id. For example, the Court countered
the dissent's opposition to the use of hindsight by arguing that no state finality interests
were at issue in Fretwel Id. Had the Court not regarded the Perry holding as a new rule, it
could have disposed of the dissent's objection merely by stating that the rule at issue was
not new, a much less controversial ground.
100. Fretwe, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
101. Id.
102. Id, (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
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issue in the prejudice prong of the Strickland test because prejudice
analysis focuses on the effect, rather than the substance, of counsel's
judgment and performance."' Presumably because counsel's per-
formance is not at issue in the prejudice analysis, a postconviction as-
sessment of its effect would not deter counsel's "ardor" or
"independence."
10 4
The Strickland Court, however, intended the frame of reference
of the prejudice inquiry to be the time of the proceeding at issue. 105
Strickland recognized that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel was "to ensure that a defendant ha[d] the assist-
ance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceed-
ing."106 Though prejudice is measured by considering the effect of
counsel's performance on the outcome of the proceeding, an ineffec-
tive assistance claim implicates the process of the proceeding-that is,
the trial or sentencing hearing itself." 7 The Strickland Court em-
braced a focus on process when it adopted the "reasonable
probability" standard for showing, under the prejudice prong, that
counsel's errors affected the outcome of the proceeding. l08 It re-
jected a stricter standard because such a standard would "presuppose
that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair
proceeding" were not in question.'0 9
Because it is the "adversarial process" itself that is called into
question, the Strickland Court maintained that the "governing legal
standard [at the time of the proceeding at issue] play[ed] a critical role
in defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from
counsel's errors."110 Moreover, it held that a reviewing court should
make its prejudice assessment through attention to "the totality of the
evidence" before the court at the time of the proceeding."' If, as the
Strickland Court contended, the objective of hearing ineffective assist-
103. Id. ("[The prejudice test] focusses on the question [of] whether counsel's deficient
performance render[ed] the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally
unfair.").
104. See id (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
105. Id. at 849 ("[Assessing errors] based on the 'totality of the evidence before the judge
or jury' . . . establishes its point of reference firmly at the time of trial or sentencing.")
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
106. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92..
107. See id. at 694 (explaining that ineffective assistance claims involve the "absence of
one of the assurances" to which defendants are entitled as part of the process of the pro-
ceeding against them).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 695.
111. Id.
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ance claims is to protect and affirm the adversarial process,112 the
Fretwell holding that a habeas review court may apply law made after
the proceeding at issue is contradictory. The application of case law
not in force at the time of trial or sentencing undermines the reliance
on those proceedings that ineffective assistance claims were intended
to protect. By requiring petitioners to advance their claims based on a
"post hoc vision of what would have been the case years later,"1 3 Fretwell
increased unreliability and caprice in the habeas corpus review
system.'
14
2. Hindsight and retroactivity.-In Teague, the Court held that
"new rules" should not apply retroactively to a claim raised by a fed-
eral habeas petitioner on collateral review.'1 ' In Fretwell however, the
Court permitted retroactive application of a "new rule" on habeas re-
view when neither the State nor the habeas petitioner had a reliance
interest in the state court judgment made at the time of the original
adjudication." 6 In so doing, the Fretwell Court obscured the inappro-
priateness of the Teague analysis in situations where defendants seek to
avoid, rather than benefit from, new rules on collateral review."i 7
The Teague Court founded its retroactivity rule on both the states'
reliance interests in their interpretations of federal law and the pur-
poses for which habeas collateral review is available."' The Teague
Court emphasized the deterrent function of habeas." 9 It held that
the purpose of the habeas writ is to serve as a "necessary additional
incentive for [state] trial and appellate courts throughout the land to
conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established
112. See id. at 686 ("The benchmark for judging any claim of uneffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial pro-
cess that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.").
113. Fretwell 113 S. Ct. at 849 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 852 ("[T]he Court's decision marks a startling and most unwise departure
from our commitment to a [habeas review] system that ensures fairness and reliability
... .") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
116. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844. The Court seemed to suggest that because the Supreme
Court of Arkansas did not rely on Collins in reviewing Fretwell's claim, it would not be
"penalized for relying on 'the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the origi-
nal proceedings took place.'" Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 306). In other words, be-
cause the court neglected to invoke Collins, there was no "good faith interpretation of
existing precedents" that needed to be validated by restraining the habeas court from ap-
plying new rules. Id
117. Id.
118. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 ("'The relevant frame of reference... is... the purposes
for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.'") (quoting Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971)).
119. Id.
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constitutional standards."12° The Teague rule recognized the compet-
ing interests of reliance and habeas review and sought to let them
both operate within the scope of the retroactivity rule. 121
Fretwell presented an unusual situation in that no state reliance
issues were at stake in Fretwell's habeas petition. Because the Collins
objection was never made at the sentencing proceeding, the State
never made a "good-faith interpretation" of the precedent at issue,
namely Collins.122 Confronted with a petitioner seeking to avoid retro-
active application of a new rule, the Fretwell Court, instead of finding
that the petitioner had no liberty interest in a habeas remedy,
grounded its denial of relief on the habeas petitioner's lack of a final-
ity interest. 2  The Fretwell Court thus ignored the fact that Teague's
retroactivity rule was founded on both the petitioners' interest in a
habeas remedy and the state's interest in finality.124
In basing its retroactivity argument on the petitioner's lack of fi-
nality interests, the Fretwell Court failed to acknowledge that the case
before it raised an issue that it had not addressed previously in Teague
or its progeny.125 Teague considered the retroactivity on collateral re-
view of "new rules" that had the effect of benefitting petitioners' habeas
claims. 126 The petitioner in Fretwell, however, sought to avoid the ap-
plication of the new rule announced in Perry.127 Moreover, the peti-
tioner in Fretwell was uniquely situated. Given that the judge in
Fretwell's sentencing proceeding did not rule on the permissibility of
a Collins objection, 12 there was no "good-faith interpretation" of fed-
eral law that needed protecting under the retroactivity rule. Because
120. Id. (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
121. This principle is evident in the Court's adoption of the two exceptions to its retro-
activity rule. See supra note 332. The exceptions are evidence of the Court's recognition
that the importance of the states' interests in reliance recedes where a petitioner's interest
in a trial free of constitutional error is at issue.
122. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
123. Id.
124. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306, 309. See also supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (holding that retroactivity should
protect reasonable good-faith interpretations by the states); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407 (1990) (holding that a "new rule" is announced whenever there is a "reasonable disa-
greement" among courts as to prior precedent); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
(holding that a "new rule" is not created when a decision merely "fulfills the assurance" of
prior precedent). See also Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal
Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. Rav. 371, 391 (1990) (discussing the impact of
Teague on retroactivity jurisprudence of the lower federal courts).
126. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294.
127. Fretwell, 113. S. Ct. at 841.
128. Id. at 844.
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the Fretwell Court failed to expressly address this difference and its im-
plications for the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence, lower courts may
read the Fretwell holding broadly to allow the retroactive application of
"new rules" on habeas whenever they benefit a state, even if a state has
made a prior "good faith interpretation" of the existing federal law. 129
Indeed, one lower court has already invoked this more expansive
reading of Fretwell. In Wedra v. Lefevre,"'3 a defendant brought a
habeas petition in federal court claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel for his attorney's failure to present evidence rebutting the
prosecution's claim that he had fled from the scene of a murder.'3 1
The petitioner had already defaulted on direct appeal by failing to
seek appeal within the thirty days required by New York law.'3 2 The
district magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on the habeas
petition and, nineteen months later, held that while the petitioner's
claim was not procedurally barred, it should be denied on the mer-
its. "'33 Five months after the issuance of the report, the Supreme
Court decided Coleman v. Thompson.'34 In Coleman, the Court held
that if a state prisoner has defaulted on his federal claims in state
court, "federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the pris-
oner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice...
or... that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice."13 5 Nearly one year later in Wedra, the district
court retroactively applied Coleman and denied the petition.' 6
Citing the retroactive application of Coleman as a violation of his
due process rights, the petitioner appealed.' 37 Relying on Fretwell, the
Second Circuit held that when a court is faced with a habeas peti-
tioner who is relying on an old rule in the face of a new rule that is
adverse to his interests, the court may apply the new rule retroactively
because the defendant has no finality interest in the state court deci-
129. Twenty-two states advocated this interpretation in their amici brief filed in FretwelL
Brief of the States of California, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, NewJersey, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wyo-
ming as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 8, Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838
(1993) (No. 91-1393).
130. 988 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1993).
131. Id at 337-38.
132. I,
133. Id
134. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
135. Id at 2565.
136. Wedra, 988 F.2d at 338.
137. Id
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sion. 13 Because, under the Coleman rule, Wedra's petition was proce-
durally barred, the court denied his petition for habeas corpus.13 1
C. Policy Impact on Habeas Corpus
Justice O'Connor maintained in her concurrence that the
Court's decision in Fretwell was a narrow one simply nullifying a factor
that ought not to inform the prejudice inquiry of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. 4 ° As is clear from at least one lower court's read-
ing of Fretwell, however, the decision has a potentially broader
reach. 4 ' Fretwell may be taken to stand for the proposition that in
defending against habeas petitions, states may assert case law decided
subsequent to the close of a petitioner's direct appeal whenever the
state will benefit from that law.142 Thus, Fretwell may be read as creat-
ing a third exception to Teague. New rules may now be applied retro-
actively when (1) they make certain activities that once were illegal no
longer illegal, (2) they represent watershed doctrines of criminal pro-
cedure,143 or (3) they benefit the state.
Given this reading of the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence,
states responding to habeas petitioners in federal court may have a
new tactic at their disposal. When petitioners seek the benefit of case
law in force at the time of their trials or sentencing proceedings, states
may argue that those interpretations have been overruled by subse-
quent decisions, and that the new rules can be applied retroactively
because the petitioners have no finality interest in the earlier proceed-
ings. 144 Consequently, a state may be able to defend against a habeas
petition by undermining confidence in its own constitutional interpre-
tation in force at the time of the state proceeding. This implication of
Fretwell contradicts the policy underlying retroactivity. Retroactivity
was intended to "validate[ ] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
138. See idu at 341.
139. Id.
140. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. See supra notes 127-136 and accompanying text.
142. It remains to be seen whether other lower courts or the Supreme Court itself will
clarify the retroactivity doctrine applicable when petitioners seek to avoid application of
"new rules." The Fretwell Court stopped short of adopting an explicit retroactivity doctrine
even though it could have done so on the facts of the case, and even though 22 states
advocated such a ruling in their amici brief. Amici Brief at 8, Fretwell (No. 91-1393). The
Court's refusal to adopt a clear rule for future applications may suggest that the FretweU
holding was intended to be limited to its facts.
143. See supra note 32 for a discussion of the first two exceptions.
144. This new tactic is of one piece with the "systematic bias in favor of narrow interpre-
tations of criminal procedure protections" created by Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 422
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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... precedents [existing at trial] made by state courts even though they
are shown to be contrary to later decisions. "145 Thus, the retroactive appli-
cation of "new rules" will operate to thwart the goal of the retroactivity
rule to protect finality in state court decisions.
CONCLUSION
In Fretwell, the Court increased the requirements for a showing of
prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims and expanded the
applicability on collateral review of new rules that benefit states in
habeas petitions. The Court altered its prejudice standard without ba-
sis in the prior case law that it invoked as support. More significantly,
it allowed a "new rule" benefitting the State to be applied on habeas
review. Though the sweep of the Fretwell view of retroactivity is un-
clear, lower courts may interpret the case as permitting the retroactive
application of "new rules" whenever such rules benefit a state's de-
fense against habeas petitioners.
TERESA K. LAMASTER
145. Fretwel, 113 S. Ct. at 844 (emphasis added).
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